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Abstract 
In the past five years, the Supreme Court has upheld numerous warrantless 
searches and seizures. What has permitted this increased in searches determined 
to be constitutional? Traditionally, the Supreme Court utilized a test-based 
approach in determining whether a search or seizure is constitutional. I argue that 
recent decisions justifying search programs have relied on a reasonableness 
balancing approach. Why has the Supreme Court abandoned the test-based 
approach in favor of a reasonableness analysis? To answer this question, I 
examine Supreme Court decisions dealing with search and seizure programs, 
determine common patterns in past decisions and in recent reasonableness 
decisions, and compare these patterns. To examine the evolution of search and 
seizure law, I: (i) track the development of the many tests used to justify 
warrantless searches and seizures: (ii) determine when the court abandoned the 
established test in favor of a reasonableness or ‘totality of the circumstances’ 
approach: and (iii) examine the rationale for this change. Although the Supreme 
Court offers no rationale for this turn to a reasonableness inquiry, there is strong 
reason to conclude that the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 substantially 
affected Supreme Court Fourth Amendment adjudication.  
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 Changes in law demand a thorough account; yet, the Supreme Court has offered 
no account for their recent changes in search and seizure law. In determining what 
searches and seizures meet the demands of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court 
sets the parameters for permissible law enforcement action. Yet the Supreme Court is 
also vulnerable to the same impulses that tempt law enforcement officers to push the 
boundaries of the law. Over many decades, the Court has crafted a variety of legal tools 
to adjudicate these searches and seizures, including the Brown v. Texas test and the 
Special Needs analysis, and has also outlined other factors crucial in determining Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness. In the past five years, however, the Supreme Court has 
largely ignored these tests and factors in favor of a more general reasonableness analysis. 
This general reasonableness analysis seeks to balance the degree of intrusion into 
individual privacy with the governmental concerns furthered by the search or seizure. 
Using this analysis, the Supreme Court has approved many searches and seizures deemed 
unconstitutional by lower courts applying the previously prevailing tests and standards.  
This paper has two main objectives. The first, which will comprise the bulk of the 
analysis, is to demonstrate that there has been a substantial change in the Supreme 
Court’s Fourth Amendment adjudication over the past five years. The first two sections 
of this paper show how the Supreme Court abandoned its older, more stringent standards 
of review (the Brown v. Texas test and the Special Needs test) in favor of a newer, ad hoc 
analysis (the reasonableness analysis). The second aim of the paper is to interpret the 
reasons for and significance of this change. In particular, the evidence gives us strong 
reason to conclude that the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 played a crucial role 
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in the substitution of the reasonableness analysis for previously established tests and 
standards in an expanding class of search and seizure cases. 
In the past five years, the Supreme Court has approved eight warrantless, searches 
and seizures utilizing the reasonableness balancing analysis. Although the Supreme Court 
has recognized many exceptions to the warrant requirement, recent cases have expanded 
the use of the reasonableness analysis to circumstances previously adjudicated under tests 
or using a factor based analysis. This new, broader approach permits substantially more 
searches than the previously used tests and factors. The heavy reliance on this test 
occurred immediately after the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, and the 
rationales offered for the new standard of adjudication echo common concerns raised by 
the challenge of fighting terrorism. 
Since the passage of the Bill of Rights, the 4th Amendment has protected the 
“right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.” The requirements of this Constitutional provision 
are normally satisfied when a law enforcement official submits a warrant to search a 
specific location for specific items to a magistrate for approval. These searches are 
Constitutional because they satisfy the second clause of the Fourth Amendment: “no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”  
During the 1970s and 1980s, the Supreme Court adopted several narrowly tailored 
balancing tests for determining the reasonableness of warrantless searches: the Brown v. 
Texas test for police searches and the Special Needs test for non-investigatory searches. 
However, since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11th, 2001, 
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there has been an increase in the number and types of warrantless searches and seizures 
upheld by the highest court. According to the Supreme Court Database, in the four years 
after September 11th, 2001, the Supreme Court approved all of the searches and seizures 
it considered, while in the four years prior to the attacks, it approved only two thirds of 
such cases.1 To approve these searches, the Supreme Court has moved away from 
narrowly tailored tests and factors and turned toward a general reasonableness analysis. 
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, members of the Court have 
expressed repeated concerns about how search and seizure cases under consideration will 
affect national security and law enforcement agencies.. Some argue that searches are a 
crucial tool in uncovering terrorist activity. Terrorists are trained to remain undetected by 
law enforcement, setting up their own roadblocks to law enforcement investigation. 
Terrorist activity is also more dangerous than general crime and relies more often on 
explosives and other advanced weaponry and communication technology. These factors 
suggest that searches could be a crucial tool in uncovering terrorist activity.  In addition, 
the changing role of law enforcement since the terrorist attacks has lessened citizens’ 
expectation of privacy. Since a citizen’s expectation of privacy is a factor in all of the 
theories used to adjudicate Fourth Amendment cases, the diminished public expectation 
of privacy in certain areas affects the result of the various tests employed by the Supreme 
Court.  
The increased use of the reasonableness analysis has not been noticed by the 
popular press or extensively examined in law review articles. However, this does not 
diminish its importance to all citizens. While the National Security Agency is cataloging 
every phone call placed inside the United States, the Supreme Court is permitting 
                                                          
1 See appendix C. 
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warrantless searches and seizures of homes, vehicles, luggage, and persons. The rationale 
for upholding these searches must be thoroughly examined to ensure the protections of 
the Fourth Amendment are preserved. 
I) Historic Analysis of Search and Seizure Cases 
“But we have traditionally recognized that a responsible Fourth Amendment 
balance is not well served by standards requiring sensitive, case-by-case 
determinations of government need, lest every discretionary judgment in the field 
be converted into an occasion for constitutional review.” Atwater v. Lago Vista 
 
A) Development of Tests 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the Supreme Court developed tests relying on 
objective criteria and a list of exceptions to the warrant requirement in an attempt to 
codify the law and establish guidelines for law enforcement agencies. These tests ensured 
that searches and seizures followed the Fourth Amendment by examining the intrusion 
caused by the search or seizure and the interests furthered by conducting the search. The 
enumerated exceptions upheld the Fourth Amendment by requiring individualized 
suspicion or exigent circumstances that made the warrant requirement impracticable. 
1) Enumerated Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement 
 
The first exception to the warrant requirement arose in 1925. In Carroll v. United 
States, Chief Justice William Howard Taft determined that a search of an automobile is 
constitutional if the totality of the circumstances provides officers with sufficient reason 
to believe a law was being violated.2 The importance of preventing crime while it was 
being committed introduced exigent circumstances that made the warrant requirement 
impracticable. This case introduced a broad reasonableness analysis to be used when 
obtaining a warrant was impracticable. However, this exception still required 
                                                          
2 In this case, the violation was bringing liquor across the US-Canadian border during prohibition. Carroll 
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) 
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individualized suspicion – the ‘totality of the circumstances’ analysis was used to 
determine if the standard of suspicion was met. 
Over the years, the Supreme Court condoned other suspicion-based, warrantless 
searches using different rationales.3 The first such search explicitly recognized was a pat-
down search conducted with articulable, reasonable suspicion that the persons searched 
were recently involved in criminal activity.4 Searches conducted incident to the lawful 
arrest of an individual were also found constitutional. These searches are confined to the 
area immediately accessible to the suspect -- justified by the importance of controlling 
weapons in the immediate control of people in police custody for the safety of the police.5  
Warrantless searches were also found to be permissible when the subject waived 
his expectation of privacy. Likewise, searches of heavily regulated industries, like gun 
sales, may be conducted with less than probable cause because frequent administrative 
inspections diminish the expectation of privacy.6 An officer may search a home, person, 
or vehicle with the freely given consent of the relevant party. Consent cases are reviewed 
under a totality of the circumstances analysis to ensure that law enforcement agents did 
not create a coercive environment that nullifies consent. This can only be determined 
through examining all the actions of law enforcement. Likewise, searches and seizures in 
public space of people believed to be involved in criminal activity are reviewed under a 
totality of the circumstances analysis to ensure officers met the standard of suspicion 
necessary to justify a Fourth Amendment intrusion. Many other warrantless searches earn 
approval under two more systematic tests developed by the Supreme Court. 
                                                          
3 For a review of approaches to the Fourth Amendment, see Clancy, Thomas K.. “The Fourth 
Amendment’s Concept of Reasonableness.” Utah Law Review (2004): 977- 1044. 
4 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
5 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 
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2) Brown v. Texas Test for Law Enforcement Actions in Public Space 
 
For searches and seizures conducted to uncover evidence of criminal wrongdoing, 
the Supreme Court developed the Brown Balancing Test. This test determines if stops by 
police officers in public places are Constitutional. The test balances three factors: (1) the 
gravity of public interest in conducting the test, (2) the degree to which the search 
advances public interest, and (3) the severity of interference with individual liberty 
during the search or seizure.  
This test was elaborated in the unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice 
Warren Burger in the 1979 case Brown v. Texas. This case dealt with a Texas statute that 
permitted the arrest of a man who refused to identify himself when lawfully stopped by 
the police. Ultimately, this seizure was deemed unconstitutional because the officer 
lacked any reasonable suspicion connecting Mr. Brown to any criminal activity. At the 
trial level, Mr. Patton the prosecutor attempted to justify the law by balancing the same 
interests. Patton stated:   
"Well, the Governmental interest to maintain the safety and security of the 
society and the citizens to live in the society, and there are certainly strong 
Governmental interests in that direction and because of that, these interests 
outweigh the interests of an individual for a certain amount of intrusion 
upon his personal liberty. (sic) I think these Governmental interests 
outweigh the individual's interests in this respect, as far as simply asking 
an individual for his name and address under the proper circumstances.7"  
 
The Court determined that this balance did not permit the seizure of the defendant. Many 
cases have appealed to the balancing test delineated in Brown.8 Michigan Dept. of State 
                                                                                                                                                                             
6 United States v. Biswell: 406 U.S. 311 
7 Brown v. Texas 443 U.S. 47, 54 
8 Statutes guiding police stops: Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983)  Searching Factories for illegal 
aliens: INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984).  
Page 8 of 65 
Andrea Kendall  6/5/2006 
Police v. Sitz stated that Brown is the relevant authority for evaluating checkpoints.9 Also 
in Brown, the arresting officers claimed they had reasonable suspicion to arrest Mr. 
Brown. The Court denied this assertion -- reasonable suspicion must be based on 
objective, articulable facts. The need for reasonable suspicion is Brown's major 
contribution to Fourth Amendment adjudication; however, in the absence of 
individualized suspicion, the Brown balancing test still governs. 
3) Special Needs Test for Non-Investigatory Law Enforcement Action 
 
While the Brown balancing test governs police conducted search and seizure 
programs, the Special Needs doctrine governs searches and seizures not aimed to 
discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing. These searches serve other important 
governmental ends, like ensuring a safe, educational environment in public schools. The 
Special Needs test balances the degree of intrusion into individual privacy or personal 
security represented by the search with the promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests served by the search. To avoid unbridled discretion, these programs require 
neutral criteria to determine who will be tested and insist that the search or seizure be 
limited in scope.10
The phrase "Special Needs" first appeared in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in 
Justice Harry Blackmunn's dissent in Florida v. Royer. He declared: "(t)he special need 
for flexibility in uncovering illicit drug couriers is hardly debatable."11 To Blackmunn  
the importance of uncovering narcotics smuggling allowed officers to search a closed 
suitcase based on reasonable suspicion -- a lesser standard than the required probable 
cause. Two years later, the majority used the Special Needs test in New Jersey v. T. L. O..  
                                                          
9 Michigan Department of Police v. Rick Sitz 496 U.S. 444 (1990) 
10 Hubbart 283. 
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In New Jersey v. T. L. O., a teacher entered the ladies restroom to find a student 
with the initials T. L. O. smoking cigarettes. T.L.O. denied that she had been smoking 
and refused to hand her cigarettes over to the teacher. The teacher brought T.L.O. to the 
principal's office. T.L.O. refused to cooperate and the principal opened her purse and 
removed a pack of cigarettes. After finding this contraband, the principal saw rolling 
papers and searched through T.L.O.'s purse and discovered marijuana. At this time, the 
principal called the police. 
In a footnote, the majority opinion specifically recognized the Special Needs 
doctrine: "the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by school authorities, 
but the special needs of the school environment require assessment of the legality of such 
searches against a standard less exacting than that of probable cause."  The Court decided 
that the degree of intrusion into individual privacy was small since the school principal 
only opened her purse to peer inside. Conversely, the governmental interest in promoting 
a safe learning environment is great. Teachers and administrators cannot and should not 
focus on uncovering evidence of wrong doing -- they are not trained, they have many 
students to tend to, and students should be able to trust teachers and not worry that they 
are under constant surveillance. To allow authorities to foster a better learning 
environment, they need not have probable cause for a search. These Special Needs allow 
school authorities to search based on reasonable suspicion that "the search will uncover 
evidence of an infraction of school disciplinary rules or a violation of the law." The 
search must be justified at its inception and limited in its scope. For T.L.O., this limited 
search revealed rolling papers that gave the principal probable cause for a further search. 
B) Constitutional Warrantless Search and Seizure Programs prior to 2001 
                                                                                                                                                                             
11 Florida v. Royer, 460 US 491, 519 (1983) 
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"In the four years since this Court, in T. L. O., first began recognizing "special 
needs" exceptions to the Fourth Amendment, the clarity of Fourth Amendment 
doctrine has been badly distorted, as the Court has eclipsed the probable-cause 
requirement in a patchwork quilt of settings . . ..  Tellingly, each time the Court 
has found that "special needs" counseled ignoring the literal requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment for such full-scale searches in favor of a formless and 
unguided "reasonableness" balancing inquiry, it has concluded that the search in 
question satisfied that test." Dissent Skinner v. Railway Employees 
 
Under guidance from the tests established, the Supreme Court examined 
numerous warrantless search and seizure programs. These programs search or seize many 
people without individualized suspicion that any one of them is involved in criminal 
activity. Because warrants are impracticable, law enforcement developed other avenues 
of meeting the demands of the Fourth Amendment. At a minimum, the program must be 
neutral in its application. Often, additional steps must be taken to ensure the program 
does not unduly infringe on the privacy of individuals. One type of warrantless, 
suspicionless search program is searches of passengers on a bus. These programs earn 
constitutionality by relying on the consent of the passengers to be searched. The other 
types of prevalent warrantless, suspicionless programs are checkpoint seizures and drug 
testing searches. 
1) Checkpoints – Authorized and Unauthorized Used 
 
Checkpoints, also called roadblocks, are traffic obstructions constructed by law 
enforcement agencies to allow officers the chance to question passersby’s. Since their 
first use at the US-Mexico border, these controversial search programs have divided the 
court. All checkpoints are suspicionless, warrantless seizures. Drivers are stopped 
without any facts indicating that any one driver has recently committed a crime, is in the 
process of committing a crime, or is planning to commit a crime. These programs are not 
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sanctioned by a magistrate-signed warrant. Furthermore, the Court has held that these 
checkpoints constitute seizures in the constitutional sense. In Brower v. Inyo County, the 
Court ruled that when a driver is forced to stop, he has been seized.12 In Brower, the 
driver died after crashing into the police car set up to stop him; the Court unanimously 
held that this was a seizure. That particular seizure was denied Constitutional protection 
because it did not follow the standard established in Brown v. Texas.  
Traditionally, the Court has limited the uses of checkpoints to investigating drunk 
driving and illegal immigration. These types of checkpoints are justified by the important 
governmental concern in securing the borders and ensuring safety on the highways. The 
Court upheld these uses based on a Special Needs analysis. The concerns are grave, the 
use of a checkpoint is closely tied to the goal of securing safe roadways, and the intrusion 
must be limited in scope.  
The first checkpoint case, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte articulated objective 
criteria used to determine the intrusiveness of a stop.13 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte 
allowed checkpoints to question drivers and passengers about their national origin in 
order to investigate illegal immigration. These checkpoints were allowed because of the 
inherent difficulty of policing a long border and the minimized intrusion. The court noted 
the stationary nature of this semi-permanent checkpoint, the length of the stop, length of 
questioning, and presence and degree of a search as the objective elements of intrusion. 
Subjective elements of intrusion include visibility of checkpoint operation, signs of police 
authority, and amount of police discretion. The dissenters in Martinez-Fuerte lamented 
                                                          
12 Brower v. Inyo County 489 U.S. 593 (1997). 
13 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
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that Mexican appearance is still an acceptable justification for sending cars to the 
secondary staging area where officers have a great amount of discretion.  
The Court has a long tradition of overruling checkpoints. Until 1990, the only 
checkpoints allowed were border checkpoints specifically sanctioned by Martinez-
Fuerte. In Michigan v. Sitz, the Court determined that the Fourth Amendment allowed 
drunk driving checkpoints.14 After "weighing the gravity of the public concerns served by 
the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity 
of the interference with individual liberty," the sobriety checkpoint was deemed 
constitutional since it dealt with the safety of the highways and passed the other two 
prongs of the Brown v. Texas test.15
Even this checkpoint caused controversy on the court. Two separate dissents 
argued that the majority misapplied precedent. Justice Stevens asserted that the Court 
abandoning the criteria established in Martinez-Fuerete. The Michigan checkpoint 
program established checkpoints at different locations on different days, so it depended 
on surprise. This contradicted the objective elements laid out in Martinez-Fuerte. Also, 
the officers must use subjective criteria to determine if a person is intoxicated. This 
makes searches and arrests at drunk driving checkpoints more discretionary than those 
arising from border checkpoints where people are investigated or arrested if they lack a 
proper driver’s license or immigration papers.  
In their dissent, Justices Brennan and Marshall argued that the majority was 
misapplying Brown. According to the dissent, sobriety checkpoints are ineffective 
relative to the amount of  drunk driving arrests made by patrolling officers based on 
                                                          
14 Michigan Department of Police v. Rick Sitz 496 U.S. 444 (1990) 
15 Brown v. Texas 443 U.S. 47 at 51 
Page 13 of 65 
Andrea Kendall  6/5/2006 
probable cause. The dissent also pushed for a more stringent standard of review: the 
government must justify their use of a checkpoint by demonstrating that stops based on 
reasonable suspicion would be impractical even for a minimally intrusive seizure.16 
Dissenters also criticized the majority’s reliance on Martinez-Fuerte. Investigating drunk 
driving and immigration entail very different tactics; officers could monitor cars and act 
based upon probable cause if a driver exhibits signs of intoxication.  
Unauthorized Checkpoint Uses 
In Delaware v. Prouse, the Supreme Court overturned a random patrol stop to 
check a driver’s license.17 Citing a lack of discretion as the primary reason for 
overturning the stop, the Court stated that a checkpoint program may be an acceptable 
way to check drivers’ licenses. The Court has not yet ruled on a driver's license 
checkpoint program. 
The checkpoint in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond appeared to be a license 
checkpoint, furthering the public interest by ensuring unsafe drivers are kept off the 
roads.18 In Prouse the Court hypothetically approved a brief checkpoint designed to 
check drivers' licenses. However, while the cars were seized one officer checked licenses, 
and another officer walked a trained drug dog around the cars. Signs warning drivers of 
the stop stated that it was a narcotics checkpoint using a narcotics canine. The primary 
purpose of this checkpoint was admitted to be finding illegal drugs in the car.  
Ultimately, the Court decided the primary purpose of searching for drugs was 
synonymous to the general interest in crime control and was too weak to justify any 
intrusion. Edmond was decided on a 6 to 3 vote; it is one of only two car search cases 
                                                          
16 Michigan v. Sitz 496 U.S. 444 at 457 
17 Delaware v. Prouse 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
18 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond. 531 US 32 (2000). 
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decided liberally by this court. Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion of the court and 
reiterated the important purposes served by Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz, the difficulty of 
guarding a large border, and the importance of removing impaired drivers from the road 
immediately. Since the primary purpose was searching for drugs, the checkpoint was 
unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment. The court rejected the notion that 
since all checkpoints result in arrests they are all conducted in the general interest of 
crime control. Instead the court "must consider the nature of the interests threatened and 
their connection to the particular law enforcement practices at issue."19 Investigating 
smuggling contraband is not an acceptable purpose since it can be used to justify any 
stop. The court "cannot sanction stops justified only by the generalized and ever-present 
possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given motorist has 
committed some crime."20 The programmatic purpose of a seizure must go beyond the 
general interest in crime control. The court refused “to suspend the usual requirement of 
individualized suspicion where the police seek to employ a checkpoint primarily for the 
ordinary enterprise of investigating crimes.”21
The dissent argues that the checkpoint is valid under the Brown test and that the 
Court should not conduct further special needs analysis. While the majority stated that the 
checkpoint served no legitimate governmental interest, the dissent states that the 
secondary purposes of checking driver's licenses and looking for impaired drivers serve 
legitimate state interests. The author, Chief Justice Rehnquist, criticizes the majority for 
creating a non-law-enforcement primary purpose test. Since citizens have a lesser 
                                                          
19 Indianapolis v. Edmond 531 U.S. 32 at 42 – 43 (2000) 
20 Indianapolis v. Edmond 531 U.S. 32 at 41 (2000) 
21 Indianapolis v. Edmond 531 U.S. 32 at 44 (2000) 
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expectation of privacy in a car,22 officers conducting a checkpoint do not need to meet the 
"special needs" test required for other suspicionless searches and seizures. Instead, the 
dissent views the Brown test as analogous to the "special needs" doctrine. 
These interests allow the checkpoint to meet the other two prongs of the Brown 
balancing test according to the dissent. The minority reasoned that the objective intrusion 
was minimal since the driver's detention was short and the vehicle was not searched. The 
subjective intrusion was minimal because officers displayed visible evidence of 
authorization, followed guidelines, and had limited discretion 
2) Drug Testing Programs – Authorized and Unauthorized Used 
 
The Supreme Court accepts certain drug testing programs. In these programs, 
people are compelled to take a breathalyzer test or provide blood or urine samples that 
will be analyzed for the presence of substances such as illegal drugs or alcohol. In 1966, 
the Supreme Court held that a blood test was indeed a search that deserved Fourth 
Amendment protection.23 Since drug testing programs test large numbers of people 
without having a warrant for the search or individualized suspicion connecting any 
individual one of to a crime, these programs were unconstitutional. After the introduction 
of the Special Needs test, the Supreme Court heard a pair of cases dealing with drug 
testing programs: Treasury Employees v. Von Raab and Skinner v. Railway Labor 
Executives' Association.24  
Of the two companion cases, Von Raabs was more controversial: only five 
members of the Court upheld the search program while seven Justices upheld the 
                                                          
22 Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 at 590 (1974) 
23 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).Breathalyzer test is a search, California v. Trombetta, 467 
U.S. 479 (1984). 
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program in Skinner. The Von Raab drug program was implemented in 1986. The program 
pertained to people applying for a job that would require them to (1) have direct 
involvement in drug interdiction or enforcement or (2) carry firearms.25 Applicants 
received a letter notifying them of this requirement; the prospective employee then 
produced a urine sample at a time of their choosing. The Treasury department took 
precautions to ensure the sample is not adulterated – a supervisor of the same gender as 
the applicant remained in the room with the applicant and the applicant was required to 
remove his coat and other outer garments. The test results were not turned over to law 
enforcement agencies without the employees’ written consent, but applicants must pass 
this urinalysis to receive the jobs in any of the above mentioned two categories. 
The majority opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, applies the Special Needs test. 
According to the majority, this search serves a strong governmental interest by assisting 
in drug interdiction and ensuring that customs agents are unimpaired physically or with 
regards to their integrity and judgment. The drug tests prevent employees who are more 
easily bribed, blackmailed, assaulted, and engaged by drug dealers in violence in virtue of 
their drug use from holding positions on the front-line of interdiction.26 The drug testing 
of applicants for positions carrying firearms was justified by the government interest in 
ensuring people authorized to use deadly force are not impaired by drugs.  
The Treasury employees attacked the governmental interest by arguing that drug 
use would not be detected because samples could be altered and drug use could be hid by 
temporary abstinence. The majority noted that adulteration attempts would likely be 
                                                                                                                                                                             
24 Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).  Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 
489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
25 The procedure tests for marijuana, cocaine, opiates, amphetamines, and phencyclidine. Treasury 
Employees 489 U.S. 656 at pg. 662. 
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caught, and employees would not have enough time to abstain from drug use and provide 
a clean sample. The Treasury employees also argued that the testing procedures 
demonstrated that the governmental interest was weak by proving there was no drug use 
problem among customs employees.27 In dissent, Justice Scalia echoed this concern -- 
other suspicionless search programs responded to grave, almost epidemic, societal 
concerns.28 The majority rejected this argument and appealed to border checkpoints and 
administrative searches as evidence that search programs may be constitutional even if 
they do not uncover much evidence of infractions. Furthermore, the governmental 
interest in ensuring that employees are not susceptible to bribes and blackmail justifies 
measures taken to ensure that all employees are not using illegal drugs.  
According to the majority opinion, the degree of governmental intrusion is 
acceptable because the regulations took steps to ensure privacy during the urine 
collection process. Also, the customs employees’ expectation of privacy is reduced 
because being responsible for drug interdiction and using firearms demands exploring the 
employees’  trustworthiness, judgment and dexterity. The drug-testing program also 
pertained to people seeking jobs that would require them to handle classified material. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
26 Treasury Employees v. Von Raab at 670 
27 On five of 3,600 tests conducted showed evidence of drug use. Brief for Petitioners 37, 44; Transcript of 
Oral Argument 11  
28 "Thus, in upholding the administrative search of a student's purse in a school, we began with the 
observation (documented by an agency report to Congress) that "[m]aintaining order in the classroom has 
never been easy, but in recent years, school disorder has often taken particularly ugly forms: drug use and 
violent crime in the schools have become major social problems." New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U.S. 325, 
339 (1985). When we approved fixed checkpoints near the Mexican border to stop and search cars for 
illegal aliens, we observed at the outset that "the Immigration and Naturalization Service now suggests 
there may be as many as 10 or 12 million aliens illegally in the country," and that "[i]nterdicting the flow of 
illegal entrants from Mexico poses formidable law enforcement problems." United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 551 -552 (1976). And the substantive analysis of our opinion today in Skinner begins, 
"[t]he problem of alcohol use on American railroads is as old as the industry itself," and goes on to cite 
statistics concerning that problem and the accidents it causes, including a 1979 study finding that "23% of 
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The Court declined to decide whether these tests were constitutional because the record 
was insufficient.29
Along with Von Raab, the Supreme Court considered whether railway employees 
who had been in work-related accidents or break safety rules could be subjected to drug 
tests.30 The Federal Railway Association established the regulations permitting either 
blood or breathalyzer tests. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion. His opinion 
begins by citing statistics showing that many railway employees drink while on the job 
and that these incidents have caused serious accidents. In 1985, the Federal Railway 
Association added the drug testing policy to help detect the already forbidden substance 
abuse. Immediately after an accident, all involved employees would be taken to a medical 
facility to give blood and urine samples that are later tested for drugs and alcohol. 
Justice Kennedy applied the Special Needs test. The governmental interest 
advanced by the search is ensuring safety on the railroads. According to the majority 
opinion, "(t)he Government's interest in regulating the conduct of railroad employees to 
ensure safety, like its supervision of probationers or regulated industries, or its operation 
of a government office, school, or prison, likewise presents Special Needs."31 Kennedy 
also noted that railroad workers are part of a highly regulated industry; therefore, they are 
subject to more regulations. 
The district court held these tests unconstitutional because employers lacked 
particularized suspicion that the employee was impaired at the time of the accident. The 
district court argued that since requiring such a suspicion would impose "no insuperable 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the operating personnel were `problem drinkers.'" Skinner, ante, at 606, and 607, n. 1." Treasury 
Employees v. Von Raab at 681  
29 Treasury Employees v. Von Raab at 677 
30 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)  
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burden on the government" it was not too strong a requirement.32 The dissent echoed 
these concerns: "Constitutional requirements like probable cause are not fair-weather 
friends, present when advantageous, conveniently absent when Special Needs make them 
seem not.33" In dissent, Justice Marshall noted that previous Special Needs cases still 
relied on individualized suspicion.34 The district court also found the regulation 
unconstitutional because this testing scheme mandated urine tests that revealed the use of 
drugs at sometime in the past. In contrast, blood analysis revealed only the current 
presence of these substances. If the testing were based on individualized suspicion, 
employees who were not impaired at the time of the accident but had traces of drugs still 
in their system from previous use would be less likely to be tested. The dissent also 
highlighted this concern, noting that urine tests revealed much more personal information 
about the employee, including if the individual is pregnant, epileptic, or diabetic, and 
should be used only to corroborate the presence of substances found in a blood test. 
As evidence that the individualized suspicion requirement demanded too much of 
safety personnel investigating accidents and infractions, the majority argued that low 
levels of impairment may still be dangerous and are hard to observe. Before these testing 
regulations were enacted, railroad officials had difficulty discovering substance use. The 
chaotic accident scene makes it hard for investigators to determine who even played a 
role in the accident let alone determine if these individuals were impaired at the time. The 
                                                                                                                                                                             
31 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association, 489 U.S. 602 at 620 (1989) 
32 Railway Labor Executives' Assn. v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 588 (1988). 
33 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association, 489 U.S. 602 at 637 (1989). 
34 "And until today, it was conceivable that a prerequisite for surviving "special needs" analysis was the 
existence of individualized suspicion. No longer: in contrast to the searches in T. L. O., O'Connor, and 
Griffin, which were supported by individualized evidence suggesting the culpability of the persons whose 
property was searched, the regulatory regime upheld today requires the post-accident collection and testing 
of the blood and urine of all covered employees - even if every member of this group gives every indication 
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dissent argued that a search conducted by collecting fluid samples might be authorized 
without a warrant because the accidence scene introduces exigent circumstances. Testing 
the samples for evidence of drug use, however, is a further search. Justice Marshall 
argued that this search must be authorized by a warrant.  The majority also found 
deterring substance use to be a weighty goal of this program. Three Justices rejected this 
supplemental rationale. 
The majority found that the degree of governmental intrusion is minimal. Since 
employees have a lesser expectation of privacy when they are at work, and since they are 
subject to many work-related regulations as workers in the railway industry, ordering the 
employee to go to the medical facility where he will produce a sample is not problematic. 
The majority also asserts that blood tests are commonplace; people provide blood 
samples as part of a routine physical, and the breathalyzer tests permitted by the 
regulation are even less intrusive. These tests are not significant Fourth Amendment 
intrusions. Justice Kennedy had more difficulty addressing the urine sample collection. 
Again he found that since steps were taken to ensure the privacy of the employee, the 
invasiveness of urine sample collection was outweighed by the important governmental 
concern. The dissent notes that drawing blood is an invasion of privacy and cited 
precedent noting that past cases held that drawing blood demanded individualized 
suspicion.35
Kennedy argued, as he did in Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, that the 
traditional role played by warrants was filled in other ways in this process.36 The wisdom 
                                                                                                                                                                             
of sobriety and attentiveness." Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association, 489 U.S. 602 at 640 
(1989). 
35 Schmerber v. California 384 U.S., at 769 -770.  
36 Treasury Employees v. Von Raab 489 U.S. 656, 667 
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of a neutral magistrate is unnecessary because there are no subjective factors to weigh: all 
employees involved in serious accidents must undergo testing. Notice of the scope of the 
search and authorization of law is given by notice of the testing program. The majority 
also asserts that taking the time to obtain a warrant would compromise the search since 
substances are eliminated from the body at a constant rate.  
Treasury Employees v. Von Raab and Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives 
Association established the ground rules for mandatory drug testing programs. Both of 
the opinions focused on the compelling governmental interest in safety and the relatively 
low intrusion. Members of the very same court questioned these cases for operating 
without sufficient reason to believe the searches would achieve the proposed results, 
approving searches without individualized suspicion that the subjects had committed and 
infraction, and infringing on the privacy of subjects during the sample collection process. 
Although these cases were controversial at the time, Von Raab and Skinner are now the 
basis for evaluating drug testing programs.  
In Von Raab and Skinner, the Supreme Court stated that the government had a 
‘compelling interest’ in the search programs it upheld. The district courts followed suit 
and approved only search programs in which the government had a compelling interest. 
The Court changed this standard in the 1995 school drug test case Vernonia v. Acton.37 
Six Supreme Court justices agreed that compulsory drug testing of student athletes was 
justified by the Special Needs test and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Justice 
Scalia began the majority opinion by establishing the important governmental interest by 
recounting the difficulties faced by Vernonia School Districts due to the recent increase 
in drug use among students that led them to enact the drug testing program in 1989. The 
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school informed student athletes that they would be tested, obtained written consent from 
the students and their parents, and tested the students at the beginning of the sports season 
and randomly throughout the season. Students produced urine samples in a bathroom 
while a monitor ensured there was no tampering. Samples were identified by numbers 
and tested by an independent facilities.38  
The majority used a three part analysis to determine the degree of governmental 
interest in the drug testing program. Justice Scalia looked at (1) the nature of the 
governmental concern, (2) the immediacy of the concern, and (3) the efficacy of the 
search program for meeting the governmental concern. The majority found that the nature 
of the governmental concern was threefold: (1) to deter drug use among developing 
students, (2) to prevent the educational process from being disrupted, and (3) to avoid 
physical harm among student athletes.39 Deterring drug use was especially important 
since students in middle school and high school are still developing physically and 
mentally. The educational process was often disrupted as testified to by teachers and 
administrators from Vernonia schools. Finally, since student athletes are involved in 
contact sports, they are of special concern. If students are taking certain strength 
enhancing substances, it increases the chance they will harm other students. Students who 
                                                                                                                                                                             
37 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) 
38 Samples were tested for amphetamines, cocaine, and marijuana.  
39 “Apart from psychological effects, which include impairment of judgment, slow reaction time, and a 
lessening of the perception of pain, the particular drugs screened by the District's Policy have been 
demonstrated to pose substantial physical risks to athletes. Amphetamines produce an artificially induced 
heart rate increase, [p]eripheral vasoconstriction, [b]lood pressure increase, and [m]asking of the normal 
fatigue response, making them a very dangerous drug when used during exercise of any type. Marijuana 
causes [i]rregular blood pressure responses during changes in body position, [r]eduction in the oxygen-
carrying capacity of the blood, and [i]nhibition of the normal sweating responses resulting in increased 
body temperature." Id., at 94. Cocaine produces "[v]asoconstriction[,] [e]levated blood pressure, and 
[p]ossible coronary artery spasms and myocardial infarction." Internal citations omitted. 
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are on substances that impair their functioning are more likely to be harmed in these 
contact sports. 
The majority determined that the governmental concern was immediate since 
teachers reported the prevailing drug use among students and its adverse effects on the 
school environment. The majority held that the search program sufficiently furthered the 
governmental concern because it tested students without subjecting the entire student 
body to random drug tests or forcing teachers to try to detect drug use in their own 
classrooms. Justice Scalia again noted that the drug use can be hard to detect and teachers 
are not trained or well suited to examine their students for the limited symptoms.  
Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion noted that schools already investigate 
infractions and punish students based on the observations of teachers. Since teachers do 
this, they would be able to undertake the similar process of detecting symptoms of drug 
use that would amount to individualized suspicion and require the student in question to 
submit to a drug test and Vernonia's policies already permitted suspicion-based drug 
testing. The dissent also objected that the program required middle school students to 
submit to drug testing even though there was no evidence that drug abuse was prevalent 
or problematic at the middle school. James Acton, the child who refused to give his 
written consent to the drug test program and brought suit, was in seventh grade. Justice 
O’Connor furthered questioned the relationship between testing student athletes and 
detecting or preventing disruptive drug use by students at Vernonia’s high schools. There 
was little evidence that drug use was causing sports related injury and much evidence that 
it was disrupting classrooms. This focus calls into question the efficacy of the testing. 
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The dissent objected to the search program because it tested all student athletes 
without individualized suspicion that any one of them was using drugs. Requiring 
individualized suspicion would still act as a deterrent because the surest way to avoid 
suspicion action is to avoid the underlying action: drug use at school or school functions. 
Justice O’Connor appealed to the Framer’s conception of the Fourth Amendment. 
According to O’Connor and the authorities she cites, the Fourth Amendment was crafted 
to avoid the general searches and blanket searches that were prevalent during the colonial 
period and to allow only searches based on individualized suspicion.  
The dissent argued that individualized suspicion is workable in a school 
environment so it should be the preferred standard for searching students. Indeed, all 
other school search cases have dealt with suspicion-based searches and relaxed those 
standards. The examples of suspicionless searches provided by the majority, vaccinations 
and physical examinations, are justifiably suspicionless because the conditions searched 
for in those procedures rarely manifest outward signs and the medical searches are not 
accusatory. Drug use exhibits outward signs and failing to submit to the drug test resulted 
in suspension from school athletics.  
The majority argued that the in loco parentis function of schools is coupled with 
the other, governmental concerns that they display in various ways. These other concerns 
lessen their expectation of privacy and subject them to a variety of regulations. Children 
undergo vaccinations, vision and hearing screenings, and censorship of their work in 
student papers. As a more practical note, student athletes forfeit even more of their 
privacy because they dress and shower together and must meet other requirements set out 
by the athletics association. The majority argues that this quality of sports significantly 
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diminishes the privacy expectation of students.40 The intrusion is also minimal because 
students use the facilities everyday. The students argued that since the test requires 
students to disclose any prescription medications they are on to teachers and school 
administrators, it is more intrusive. The majority recognizes that this is true, but denies 
that it is significant enough to invalidate the drug-testing program.  
Unauthorized Drug Testing Programs 
The Supreme Court does not approve all drug-testing programs. Chandler v. 
Miller and Ferguson v. City of Charleston presented drug-testing programs that were 
ultimately deemed unconstitutional. Chandler v. Miller dealt with a drug program where 
all candidates for public office must be tested to be placed on the ballot. The state of 
Georgia contended that drug use interferes with a candidate’s ability to hold office: it 
impairs her ability to do public functions, and undermines public confidence and trust in 
elected officials.  
Eight of the Supreme Court justices agreed that there was no Special Need for 
testing candidates for public office. The test did not address a fear or belief that public 
officials were using illegal drugs or that such use would substantially interfere with the 
performance of their jobs. Instead, candidates could choose the date of their drug test and 
avoid detection by abstaining from drug use. Furthermore, law enforcement could use 
traditional means to detect these law breakers.  
To demonstrate the difference in governmental interest, the court distinguished 
Chandler from Von Raab. The customs employees in Von Raab encounter illegal 
substances and organized crime on a daily basis; this heightens the governmental interest 
                                                          
40 "In Vernonia's public schools, they must submit to a preseason physical exam they must acquire adequate 
insurance coverage or sign an insurance waiver, maintain a minimum grade point average, and comply with 
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in uncovering drug use by employees. Public officials, unlike customs agents who act 
without supervision, face daily scrutiny which is likely to uncover evidence of drug use. 
The lone dissenter, Chief Justice Rehnquist, argued that candidates for public 
office clearly forfeit much of their right to privacy. Taking a drug test in the comfort of 
her own doctor’s office is not a significant intrusion into the lessened expectation of 
privacy. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that when considering employees who handle 
classified information in Von Raab, the majority noted that the government may have a 
compelling interest in ensuring this information is not compromised by individuals who 
use drugs. Chief Justice Rehnquist compared some state offices to these positions in the 
Treasury Department. No other Justice agreed with his view of the facts or analysis.  
In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, The Medical University of South Carolina 
decided to test pregnant women for drug use. The hospital was concerned about the large 
number of women using cocaine while pregnant, despite the hospital’s efforts to educate 
them on the dangers of such drug use. Beginning in 1989, the hospital collected and 
tested urine samples for evidence of cocaine use; the women were not informed of this 
additional test on the samples they provided. If patients refused to comply with treatment 
and counseling procedures, the hospital turned results over to local police. The appellants 
in Ferguson were arrested for abusing their fetuses by taking drugs.  
The Supreme Court held, in a six to three decision, that the Special Needs 
doctrine did not apply to the Medical University of South Carolina’s drug testing 
program. The drug-testing program did not deal with medical treatments for the mother 
and child; it merely discussed how to collect and maintain samples for use in court. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
any rules of conduct, dress, training hours and related matters as may be established for each sport by the 
head coach and athletic director with the principal's approval."  
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Police were involved in the day to day operations of the drug testing programs; the 
Charleston police used the test results for criminal prosecutions. Since the immediate 
goal of the drug search program was to uncover evidence of criminal wrongdoing, the 
governmental interest is indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control. 
Testing bodily fluids for evidence of drug use is a substantial intrusion. The privacy 
expectation of patients is that their medical information will not be turned over to other 
individuals without their consent. Although even state officials are required to report 
evidence of crimes to law enforcement, they have no duty to seek out such evidence to 
incriminate their patients. Furthermore, state officials have a duty to inform citizens of 
their constitutional rights. Because the governmental interest was not compelling and the 
intrusion was significant, the Special Needs doctrine does not apply to the drug test 
program. 
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II) The Turn to Reasonableness 
 
In the past five years, the Supreme Court has issued fifteen search and seizure 
opinions; fourteen of these opinions upheld the search or seizure at issue. Below I 
examine three cases considering search and seizure programs and four dealing with 
searches or seizures of individuals conducted without probable cause or a warrant. In 
each of these cases, the Supreme Court rejected the analysis of the lower court, and often 
that of the litigants, in favor of a reasonableness analysis. Each of these cases expanded 
the ability of the authorities to search and seize citizens. 
A) Newly Approved Searches of Individuals 
"[T]he Fourth Amendment requires that a seizure must be based on specific, 
objective facts indicating that society's legitimate interests require the seizure of 
the particular individual, or that the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a 
plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers." 
Brown v. Texas 
 
1) Investigatory Searches of Probationers 
In United States v. Knights the Supreme Court unanimously upheld a warrantless 
search of a person on probation conducted without probable cause.41 As a condition of his 
probation, Mr. Knights signed an order agreeing to "[s]ubmit his ... person, property, 
place of residence, vehicle, personal effects, to search at anytime, with or without a 
search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable cause by any probation officer or law 
enforcement officer.42" The issue was whether the consent to be searched granted in the 
probation order has to be for a search that is substantially related to the purposes of the 
probation or can be for the normal needs of law enforcement. 
                                                          
41 United States v. Knights 534 U.S. 112. (2001). The case was argued November 6, 200l and decided 
December 10,2001, this is the first search and seizure case heard after the 2001 terrorist attacks on the 
World Trade center 
42 United States v. Knights 534 U.S. 112 at 114. (2001). 
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Law enforcement set up surveillance around Mr. Knights’ apartment after 
suspecting he was involved in several area thefts and incidents of vandalism. Local police 
conducted the watch, not a probation officer. An officer observed someone leaving 
Knights’ apartment with large canisters he rightly thought to be explosive materials and 
other items related to the theft. Since the officer knew of Knights’ probation, he searched 
Knights’ apartment even though he lacked a warrant and probable cause that Knights had 
committed a crime and a warrant. The search revealed other explosive materials and more 
items related to the theft and vandalism.43
The Ninth Circuit Court found this search unconstitutional because it exceeded 
the conditions of the parole order. According to the lower courts, the search was 
investigatory; only probationary searches were permitted by the Special Needs test 
established in 1987.44 In Griffin v. Wisconsin, the Court asserted that a “State's operation 
of a probation system, like its operation of a school, government office or prison, or its 
supervision of a regulated industry, likewise presents Special Needs.45” This search was 
not a probationary search because it was conducted by normal law enforcement officers, 
not parole officers and because it was conducted to discover evidence of a specific crime. 
Since this search was not conducted within the confines of the probationary system, the 
warrant and probable cause requirements obtain. The respondent also noted that few state 
probation programs allowed random searches like the search conducted on Mr. Knights.46 
                                                          
43 Mentioned twice by Justice O’Connor: “with the help of hindsight, it looked like an eminently reasonable 
search, for goodness sakes.” 
44 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U. S. 868 (1987).  
45 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987). 
46 Although many states authorize the search of premises by probation officers, California and Virginia are 
the only states who do not limit the search program to searches conducted by probation officers and 
searches with probable cause.  
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The petitioner argued that the search was a product of consent: Knights consented to the 
search by signing his probation order when released from prison.  
The Supreme Court rejected both of these arguments. The Court did not decide if 
Mr. Knights had consented to be searched by signing the probation order, or if the search 
was justified by Special Needs. The Court offered no reason for ignoring the arguments 
of the appellants, stating, 
 We need not decide whether Knights’s acceptance of the search condition 
constituted consent…because we conclude that the search of Knights was 
reasonable under our general Fourth Amendment approach of “examining the 
totality of the circumstances,” with the probation search condition being a salient 
circumstance.47
 
Without offering any rationale for abandoning the arguments of the parties and the 
decision of the lower court, the Court proceeded to balance the degree to which the 
search intruded upon an individual's privacy and the degree to which it is needed for the 
promotion of legitimate governmental interests. This reasonableness balancing analysis 
considers the same elements as the Special Needs test, but it is not limited to civil 
circumstances like the Special Needs test. 
The unanimous Court asserted that being in the probation system and signing the 
probation order severely diminished Knights’ expectation of privacy. Knights’ 
probationary status increased the governmental interest in searching his home because of 
high rates of recidivism and a greater likelihood that probationers will attempt to evade 
detection of their crimes.48 Using this balance, the Supreme Court determined that 
reasonable suspicion, not probable cause, authorizes a search of a probationer’s home. 
                                                          
47 United States v. Knights at 119 Quotation from Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996). 
48 “And probationers have even more of an incentive to conceal their criminal activities and quickly dispose 
of incriminating evidence than the ordinary criminal because probationers are aware that they may be 
subject to supervision and face revocation of probation, and possible incarceration, in proceedings in which 
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During the oral argument, many Justices expressed approval of investigatory searches of 
probationers.49
As support for this view, the Supreme Court cited other temporary seizures and 
minimally intrusive searches conducted with reasonable suspicion.50  The Court also 
appealed to the limited ability of officers to temporarily seize drivers near the border.51 
The Court drew an analogy between the decision in Knights and the decision that officers 
may prevent a person from entering his residence (a temporary seizure) while obtaining a 
search warrant based on probable cause that the search will reveal evidence of criminal 
activity.52  
Knights differs significantly from the precedents cited. This search was a full 
search of a person’s home, traditionally the area receiving the most protections and the 
location where individuals have the highest expectation of privacy. It differed 
significantly from temporary detentions, like those authorized in Terry that resulted in a 
short questioning and a pat down search because this was a full scale search that must 
traditionally be accompanied by a warrant or another exception. The only exceptions to 
the warrant standard for searches of the home are searches conducted with consent, “plain 
view” searches, searches pursuant to arrest or after hot pursuit, and probationary searches 
authorized by the Special Needs doctrine. The search pursuant to a lawful seizure is 
justified by the same rationale that allows searches incident to arrest: safety of the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the trial rights of a jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, among other things, do not apply.” United 
States v. Knights at 120. 
49 Justice Souter: “why is it unreasonable for the State to say we want to encourage this kind of thing 
(intermediate punishments including probation), but part of it has to be checkups on people to make certain 
they’re not committing crimes?” Justice Ginsburg: “why isn’t this an entirely reasonable condition to say 
we have to check up on you to see that you’re not engaging in crime anymore?” Transcript of oral 
argument  
50 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968).  
51 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873 (1975).  
Page 32 of 65 
Andrea Kendall  6/5/2006 
officers (in this case those surveying the home while waiting for the warrant), and a 
concern that evidence will be destroyed. Furthermore, the Supreme Court rarely lowers 
the standard of justification for searches conducted without Special Needs driving the 
search. This search was conducted only to uncover evidence of a crime. Temporary 
seizures conducted before constitutional searches are even less intrusive: no evidence is 
seized, the seizure merely ensures nothing is destroyed. 
In using the reasonableness analysis, the Court cites two cases: Ohio v. Robinette 
and Wyoming v. Hougton.53 Both cases used the balancing analysis, but neither is an 
appropriate precedent for the search in Knights. Robinette is a consent case; the 
reasonableness analysis was used to determine if the environment was coercive. 
Houghton dealt with whether or not an officer had probable cause to search a vehicle 
where the warrant requirement is impracticable. Both consent and vehicle suspicion cases 
are traditionally adjudicated with balancing tests. Home searches are prohibited unless 
conducted with a warrant or consent.54 The application of a balancing test to a search of 
the home was unprecedented. 
It is also unusual that the Court opted for a less objective analysis. The Court 
consistently aims to codify the law so it is easier to apply and follow. In Oral Argument, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist even expressed concern over using a balancing test. During 
respondent’s argument, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, “Well, then – then one would 
never know. A police officer would never know how a court was going to react to a 
search on reasonable suspicion like this. He would have to evaluate for himself how 
serious the offense was versus all the other balancing?” 
                                                                                                                                                                             
52 Illinois v. McArthur 531 U. S. 326 (2001). 
53 Ohio v. Robinette 519 U.S. 33 (1996). Wyoming v. Houghton 526 U.S. 295 (1998). 
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2) Border traffic stops 
In United States v. Arvizu, a unanimous Supreme Court once again applied the 
‘totality of the circumstances’ test in determining that an officer had reasonable suspicion 
to seize a driver and search him when general suspicion circumstances applied.55 The 
arresting officer followed a minivan that turned away from a border checkpoint. While 
following the vehicle, the officer observed odd behavior, and stopped the minivan. After 
running the license number through the police system and discovering it was registered in 
a high drug area, the officer searched the vehicle.  
According to United States v. Cortez, law enforcement may stop and search a 
person based on a reasonable belief that the person is in the process of committing a 
crime or about to commit a crime.56 The Ninth Circuit Court held the search in Arvizu 
was unconstitutional because the officer lacked probable cause based on their analysis. 
These courts discounted many reasons for the search in their analysis because the reasons 
could be the result of innocent action, so they could not be the appropriate basis of 
probable cause.57 In oral argument, Justice Scalia conceded that some of these factors 
might not be suspicious, but later followed up on this discussion saying “Why shouldn’t I 
give the Border Patrol agent and the district court the benefit of the doubt?58” Respondent 
argued that the officer failed to couch his observations in his experience and it was 
                                                                                                                                                                             
54 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U. S. 177 (1990). Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980). 
55 United States v. Arvizu 534 U.S. 266 (2002). 
56 Terry v. Ohio and United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981). 
57 Including that officer observed in the back on the van, and noticed that the children’s knees were raised 
as if something was under them, and factors questioned by Justice Scalia below.  
58 Including respondent’s slowing down to the normal speed limit, his failure to acknowledge the officer 
after being caught speeding, and children’s extended waving at the officer. 
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appropriate to discount these factors. According to the Ninth Circuit Court, the remaining 
factors did not support a constitutional stop.59
The Supreme Court held that the totality of the circumstances gave the officer 
reasonable suspicion for the search. It was improper for the lower court to ignore some of 
the factors. The Court admitted the situation was not inherently suspicious, but asserted 
that reasonable suspicion still permitted the search. Justice O’Connor addressed the 
appropriateness of the ‘totality of the circumstances’ analysis in oral argument. She 
asked: 
Let me tell you what concerns me frankly. We live in a perhaps more dangerous 
age today than we did when this event took place. And are we going to back off 
from totality of the circumstances in an era when it may become very important to 
us to have that as the overall test? And I’m concerned that the Ninth Circuit 
opinion seemed to be a little more rigid than our precedents require or that 
common sense would dictate today.60
 
Here it is clear that the concerns arising from the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 
are close to the minds of at least some members of the Court. Notably, this case does not 
deal with terrorism or violent crimes; but rather with drug smuggling. Justice O’Connor 
is not merely concerned about safety; she is concerned about potentially stifling law 
enforcement. In this case, an officer used his experience to determine that a car was likely 
transporting contraband and stopped that car. Ultimately, the decision issued by the Court 
rejected the factor parsing of the Ninth Circuit and instead granted deference to law 
enforcement agents in the field. After reexamining the facts taken in the totality of the 
circumstances, the Court utilized a reasonableness analysis to uphold this search. 
3) ‘Knock and Announce’ warrant service 
                                                          
59 Factors remaining after the Ninth’s Circuit’s parsing included the fact that the road was rarely used, the 
road’s frequent use by smugglers, the trip’s occurrence near the checkpoint shift change, and the frequent 
use of minivans by smugglers. United States v. Arvizu 534 U.S. 266 (2002). 
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The Supreme Court also reevaluated ‘knock and announce’ warrant service. In 
this type of warrant service, the officers, having already obtained a search warrant, knock 
on the door and use force to enter the home and execute the warrant even if the occupant 
does not open the door. In the particular service considered by the Supreme Court in 
United States v. Banks, the officers followed their standard procedure.61 The officers 
knocked loudly on the door front door while other officers waited at the back door, 
waited twenty seconds, and then used a battering ram to knock down the door and enter 
the home. It was at this time that they encountered Mr. Banks leaving the shower having 
never heard the knock on his door – only the sound of it being shattered.  
The Ninth Circuit Court held the search unconstitutional and suppressed the 
evidence using factors they identified as important to determining the reasonableness of 
using no knock warrant service.62 Petitioners argued that the use of force was 
constitutional under United States v. Ramirez which stated that the governmental interest 
in executing the warrant overcomes the occupants’ interest in their physical property.63  
The Supreme Court unanimously held this search constitutional based on a ‘totality of the 
circumstances’ analysis. The opinion rejected the case-based analysis of petitioners and 
the factor-based analysis of respondents. 
In approving this use of force, the Supreme Court rejected both arguments. No 
precedent authorized the use of force to enter after the officers knocked on the door. The 
                                                                                                                                                                             
60 Arvizu was arrested in January 1998. Emphasis added. 
61 United States v. Banks 537 U. S. 1187 (2003). 
62 Factors in determining whether it is appropriate to use force to enter residence: (a) size of the residence; 
(b) location of the residence; (c) location of the officers in relation to the main living or sleeping areas of 
the residence; (d) time of day; (e) nature of the suspected offense; (f) evidence demonstrating the suspect’s 
guilt; (g) suspect’s prior convictions and, if any, the type of offense for which he was convicted; and (h) 
any other observations triggering the senses of the officers that reasonably would lead one to believe that 
immediate entry was necessary.” 282 F. 3d 699 (CA9 2002). at 704.  
63 United States v. Ramirez 523 U. S., at 70–71 (1998). 
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arguments all dealt with whether the officers could assume that the occupants had denied 
them entry—then they can use force to exercise a valid warrant. The Court ignored the 
factors enumerated by the Ninth Circuit Court to determine if the entry was reasonable in 
favor of a totality of the circumstance analysis.  
The Court asserted that police has reason to believe that exigent circumstances 
existed such as to make their timely entrance crucial for obtaining the evidence they 
sought.64 The opinion cites previous cases dealing with no-knock warrant service, where 
police forcefully enter a residence without announcing their presence at all. Police may 
execute no-knock service with reasonable suspicion that announcing their intent to enter 
would "be dangerous or futile, or ... inhibit the effective investigation of the crime.65" In 
Banks, this reasonable suspicion arose because the evidence sought increased the 
likelihood that waiting for an occupant to answer the door would compromise the search. 
The search warrant was for cocaine, an easily disposable substance. The apartment was 
small (the knock was heard by officers at the back door) so officers had reason to believe 
occupants heard the knock. The exigent circumstances arose since after the knock, the 
occupant would be alerted to the police’s imminent entry and destroy the evidence. 
In United States v. Banks, the Supreme Court again rejected the arguments of the 
parties and the decision of the lower court and applied a totality of the circumstances 
analysis. Although the Court did not employ the reasonableness inquiry, they did deviate 
from the law as understood by the appellants and the lower court. Like the reasonableness 
inquiry, a totality of the circumstances analysis leaves the law vague and more difficult to 
                                                          
64 When asked by Justice O’Conner, petitioner said the Court should not analyze this case as an exigent 
circumstance case. “QUESTION: Well, could you answer my question? Are you relying? We have to 
reweigh this, I assume, and do you want us to treat this as an exigent circumstance case or not? Yes or no? 
MR. SALMONS: No, Your Honor” Transcript of oral argument at page 14. 
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apply. Law enforcement officials have lots of discretion in serving warrants. The 
Supreme Court again employed a new rationale to uphold the decision of an officer in the 
field. 
4) Drug Dog Searches 
The Court considered the use of drug dogs in suspicionless searches in Illinois v. 
Caballes.66 Respondent Caballes was stopped for speeding. Upon learning of the stop, a 
second officer -- a K-9 drug unit – came to the scene and conducted a drug interdiction 
sniff search. The lower courts upheld this search, but the Illinois Supreme Court found it 
unconstitutional. Since the canine sniff was performed without any specific and 
articulable facts suggesting drug activity, the use of the dog unjustifiably enlarged the 
scope of a routine traffic stop into a drug investigation. 
The Court sought to determine if reasonable, articulable suspicion is necessary to 
justify using a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop. Mr. 
Wray (amicus curae for petitioner) reminded the Court that “dogs are used all over the 
country with great effectiveness in law enforcement, and the -- we -- that is a -- a 
technique that we want to encourage law enforcement to pursue.” Public safety concerns 
also arose when Justice O’Connor asked, “does it matter if, for instance, in today's world 
on Capitol Hill we're concerned about terrorist attacks. What if the dog is trained to alert 
to explosives? Now, can the police just decide they're going to sniff any car that's parked 
on Capitol Hill?”67
                                                                                                                                                                             
65 Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U. S. 385, 394 (1997). 
66 Illinois v. Caballes. 543 US ___ (2005). 
67 Transcript of oral argument Pg 26 Ln 13-16 dogs are also used to detect produce at the borders and to 
detect explosive materials. O’Connor: Pg. 35 lns. 15-20. Argued November 10, 2004. Emphasis added. 
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Petitioner argued that the sniff of a drug dog is not a search. The State also 
asserted that since citizens do not have a privacy interest in contraband, and dog sniffs 
only reveal the presence of contraband, the use of drug dogs does not violate citizens’ 
expectation of privacy. The trial court determined that this dog was reliable enough to 
provide probable cause for a search of Mr. Caballes’ trunk. Justice Kennedy repeatedly 
asserted that dog sniffs are not searches because they are not intrusions.  
Respondent argued that the sniff was a limited search and Mr. Caballes had a 
privacy interest in the contents of his vehicle. Caballes exercised this interest when he did 
not consent to a search of his vehicle. Respondent relied on Indianapolis v. Edmond’s 
asserting that searches cannot be conducted merely to further the general interest in crime 
control. During oral argument, Justices tried to square petitioner’s assertion that dog 
sniffs are searches with the plain view exception to the warrant requirement.68
In a six to two decision, the Supreme Court overturned the Illinois Supreme Court 
and found the search reasonable.69 The Court agreed with petitioner that no legitimate 
privacy interest was violated because citizens have no legitimate privacy interest in 
contraband.  
In dissent, Justice Souter introduced evidence showing that drug dogs give many 
false positives and argued that the enhanced ability of drug dogs to detect contraband is a 
search like the thermal imaging searches conducted in Kyllo v. United States. 70 In Kyllo, 
the Court determined that thermal imaging tests violate the Fourth Amendment because 
                                                          
68 For example Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). 
69 Chief Justice Rehnquist did not participate in the proceedings. 
70 Similar concerns were voiced in oral argument: “JUSTICE STEVENS: I just learned this morning that 
some very well trained dogs that are trained to alert for explosives will also alert for certain kinds of rubber 
in a tire. They didn't realize that. And I think it's entirely possible that dogs would -- there will be false 
alerts by -- by dogs because it's triggered by something that -- that is not really anticipated.” Page 11 lines 
16-22. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27 (2001). 
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they reveal private information about the home beyond the information that could be 
discovered through simple observation. This precedent held that non-intrusive methods of 
gathering information are searches and need justification. 
According to Justices Ginsburg and Souter, Terry v. Ohio governs traffic stops 
and limits the scope of the search. Bringing a drug dog to the car extended the scope of 
the stop by searching the vehicle and changed the nature of the search by making it more 
adversarial.71 Terry “requires holding that the police do not have reasonable grounds to 
conduct sniff searches for drugs simply because they have stopped someone"72  
Furthermore, the dog’s alert indicates the reasonable chance of finding contraband 
in the sniffed container. Under this analysis, the State of Illinois needs justification for the 
drug dog search. In oral argument, Justice Ginsburg noted that other suspicionless uses of 
drug dogs are justified by Special Needs that do not apply to this search.73 Justice Souter 
ended his dissent with this note: 
I should take care myself to reserve judgment about a possible case 
significantly unlike this one. All of us are concerned not to prejudge a claim 
of authority to detect explosives and dangerous chemical or biological 
weapons that might be carried by a terrorist who prompts no individualized 
suspicion. Suffice it to say here that what is a reasonable search depends in 
part on demonstrated risk. Unreasonable sniff searches for marijuana are not 
necessarily unreasonable sniff searches for destructive or deadly material if 
suicide bombs are a societal risk.74
 
Justice Ginsburg closed with a similar assurance: 
A dog sniff for explosives, involving security interests not presented here, would 
be an entirely different matter… This Court has distinguished between the general 
interest in crime control and more immediate threats to public safety… As the 
Court observed in Edmond: “[T]he Fourth Amendment would almost certainly 
permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terrorist 
                                                          
71 543 U. S. ____ (2005) GINSBURG, J., dissenting Page 5, “drug dogs are not lap dogs” quoting United 
States v. Williams, 356 F. 3d 1268, 1276 (CA10 2004) (McKay, J., dissenting) 
72  543 U. S. ____ (2005) SOUTER, J., dissenting Page 6, Ginsburg expressed similar concerns in Page two 
of her dissent. 
73 Transcript of oral argument Illinois v. Caballes Page 6 lines 14-18. 
74 543 U. S. ____ (2005) Souter, J., dissenting Footnote 7 emphasis added. 
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attack” . . . . The immediate, present danger of explosives would likely justify a 
bomb sniff under the special needs doctrine.75
 
Here the dissenting justices announce that they have considered national security 
concerns, but determined they do not control the outcome of this case. In fact, they 
explicitly announce that national security concerns would introduce new arguments: the 
very arguments rejected by the majority in this opinion.  
In Illinois v. Caballes, the Supreme Court allowed drug dog searches to be used 
even when there is no suspicion that the individual possesses drugs. This allows law 
enforcement officials to seek evidence of drug possession anytime they have lawfully 
stopped a person as long as the drug dog search does not extend the length of the stop. 
Although the decision is consistent with precedent that a drug dog sniff is not a search, it 
is certainly a expansion of existing law by sanctioning these suspicionless searches. 
B) Newly Approved Search Programs 
“For most of our constitutional history, mass, suspicionless searches have been 
generally considered per se unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. And we have allowed exceptions in recent years only where it has 
been clear that a suspicion-based regime would be ineffectual.”Dissent Vernonia 
v. Acton 
 
1) Drug Testing of Students  
Pottawatomie Schools implemented a drug testing policy that applied to all 
students participating in extracurricular activities. This program is broader than that 
approved in Vernonia v. Acton because it tested all extracurricular participants, not 
merely athletes. Pottawatomie differed from Vernonia also in that it tested participants 
past the competition season and had no relation to safety. 
                                                          
75 543 U. S. ____ (2005) GINSBURG, J., dissenting Pgs 6-9 emphasis added. 
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The district court permitted the school to implement the program but the Tenth 
Circuit Court held it unconstitutional. Pottawatomie Schools did not “demonstrate that 
there is some identifiable drug abuse problem among a sufficient number of those subject 
to the testing, such that testing that group of students will actually redress its drug 
problem.76" In fact, the school district repeatedly reported to the federal government that 
drugs posed no serious problem; alcohol use did. This stood in stark contrast to Vernonia 
Schools that had a serious drug problem and noted athletes to be the leaders of the drug 
culture. This issue garnered wide debate in oral argument. Several Justices questioned the 
appropriateness of Pottawatomie’s policy while Justice Scalia repeatedly noted that the 
tests in Von Raab and Skinner were based on evidence of a national epidemic problem, 
not departmental problems. 
Another issue debated in oral argument, was the appropriateness of using the 
Special Needs test. Justice Stevens questioned the use of Special Needs: 
“So if we get to that point then the whole notion of Special Need has more or less 
evaporated. We don’t have the special safety need as in the railroad case, we don’t 
have the unusual temptation to crime need as in the immigration case and the 
Special Need is simply the need to deter drug use among all children in all 
schools across the United States. And if the theory is Special Need it seems to me 
that the concept of Special Need has gotten lost.”  
 
Justice Souter also pushed amicus curae Deputy Solicitor General Clement further to 
analogize the program to previous Special Need cases Treasury Employees v. Von Raab 
and Skinner v. Railway Employees. Mr. Clement asserted that the relevant Special Need 
was ensuring a safe school setting and, like the customs employees in Von Raab, were on 
the front line of the drug problem. Petitioner also noted that there is an element of 
consent in participating in an activity that involves drug testing. 
                                                          
76 242 F. 3d 1264, 1278 (2001). 
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Respondent argued that there was no connection between the search policy and 
the problem. Furthermore, drug use is far more prevalent among students who do not 
participate in extracurricular activities, so testing participants is unreasonable. These 
arguments attack the second element of the Brown analysis. Respondent also noted that 
Pottawatomie implements many other traditional techniques to detect drug use, so the 
search program was not necessary to fight drug use.77  
Five Justices approved the constitutionality of this search. Justice Thomas wrote 
the majority opinion and used the Special Needs test coupled with a general 
reasonableness analysis. The Special Needs of the school environment made the warrant 
requirement unnecessary. Since the school district did not involve law enforcement, the 
Special Needs test applies. The Court held that the governmental interest was closely tied 
to the test because drug testing the large portion of the student body that participates in 
extra-curricular activities will deter drug use. The governmental interest promoted by the 
drug search was preventing and detecting drug use among students. The students have a 
limited expectation of privacy because they adhere to the regulations of their respective 
activities. This even includes the occasional communal undress mentioned in Vernonia. 
The collection procedure was very similar to that conducted in Vernonia, so it is likewise 
a negligible intrusion on privacy. 
Justice O’Connor and Justice Souter filed a separate dissent emphasizing that they 
disagreed with Vernonia and disagree with its extension in this case. The four dissenting 
justices asserted that the lack of safety and health concerns inherent in athletics removed 
the Special Needs from the program. Extracurricular activities do not diminish 
                                                          
77 Tactics included video hall monitors, drug dog searches, training teachers in detection, and mandatory 
reporting requirements. 
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participant’s expectations of privacy in the same way athletics do. The minority held that 
the search program was inappropriate because Pottawatomie was not facing a significant 
drug problem. Citing Chandler and Charleston, the minority argued that the majority 
now understated the importance of the safety and well-tailored plan elements of 
Vernonia.78 Another factor previously used to determine if a program was appropriate 
was who the information was available to. In Pottawatomie, the information was shared 
with coaches and advisors who did not carefully guard the privacy of their students: the 
choir teacher left the list of medications students were taking on her desk where other 
students could read the list. The majority brushed over this factor. 
The majority in Pottawatomie extended not only the application of the Special 
Needs doctrine to new sorts of test, but also the nature of the need. Previous Special 
Needs cases approved testing designed to combat an identified, specific, and serious 
problem. The Pottawatomie test responded to a unique situation – the school setting. The 
Need mustn’t be Special – a special situation is enough. In Pottawatomie v. Earls the 
Supreme Court ignored a traditional requirement of the Special Needs test: the 
governmental concern must be a serious concern. 
2) Searching Occupants of a Bus: US v. Drayton (2002) 
The Supreme Court also determined that a bus passenger consented to a search of 
his person in United States v. Drayton.79 In this case, the Court correctly utilized a 
‘totality of the circumstances’ analysis to determine if Mr. Drayton consented to be 
searched. In this search, two plain-clothes officers boarded a bus stopped at a station and 
                                                          
78 The defining characteristics of the two programs, however, are entirely dissimilar. The Vernonia district 
sought to test a subpopulation of students distinguished by their reduced expectation of privacy, their 
special susceptibility to drug-related injury, and their heavy involvement with drug use. GINSBURG, J. 
Dissenting. 
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discretely approached each row of seats. One officer stood behind the seats, another stood 
near the door of the bus. Neither officer blocked the aisle. The first officer explained to 
the row of passengers that he wanted to search the passengers but never said the 
passengers were free to deny the request. Drayton and a companion were approached in 
this manner. After Drayton’s companion consented to a search that immediately revealed 
drugs, Drayton submitted to a search that revealed more drugs. This search differed from 
precedent because the officer did not say Drayton could refuse to be searched and the 
search extended beyond a search of luggage to a pat-down search of the person. 
The Eleventh Circuit Court found that Drayton did not agree to the search. 
Among the reasons the consent was coerced was that the officer’s show of authority to 
each person indicated the passenger could not refuse the search. The Circuit Court found 
this no less coercive than a public display of authority that was a factor previously used to 
determine if consent was coerced.80 The Circuit Court also noted that no one else on 
Drayton’s bus refused the officers’ request or left the bus to avoid search. This 
strengthens the respondent’s position that officer’s show of authority to the passengers 
did not alert them that they could refuse the search. Drayton did not know he could 
decline the search and so did not actually consent to the search: the officer’s request was 
a demand. Although the majority directly contradicted the opinion of the Eleventh Circuit 
Court, the dissent argued that passengers might not know they were free to deny the 
search request because the officer did not say that was an acceptable option.  
In overruling the Eleventh Circuit, the six-member majority announced that the 
Drayton search was not coerced. Less than one minute into oral argument, petitioner 
                                                                                                                                                                             
79 United States v. Drayton 536 US 194 (2002).  
80 United States v. Guapi, 144 F.3d 1393 at 1397 (11th Cir.1998). 
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reminded the Court what was at stake in this case: “These encounters are also important 
in today’s environment with respect to the protection of passengers in the Nation’s public 
transportation system.”81 Public transportation is a frequent target of terrorist attacks, 
whether it be airplane hijackings in the 1970s and 1980s, bus bombings in Israel, trains in 
Madrid, or the recent bus bombings in London. Airplanes address this concern by 
extensively screening passengers; buses have no standing security procedures.  
The Court had previously endorsed a factor-based analysis to determine if an 
encounter with law enforcement was coercive, but in this case they rejected the factors 
highlighted by the Circuit Court in their ‘totality of the circumstances’ analysis.82 Instead, 
the Court used a balancing analysis and focused on the facts supporting their position: 
The officer was not threatening because he wore plain-clothes, announced his presence to 
each row individually, not to the whole bus, and did not announce that he carried a 
weapon. The majority also noted that passengers were free to terminate the discussion 
and could leave the bus entirely since neither officer blocked the path.  
Again, the Supreme Court rejected a factor-based analysis in favor of a 
reasonableness analysis. The Court downplayed the factors highlighted by the Circuit 
Court: the passengers were not explicitly told that they could refuse search, the officer’s 
show of authority, the expansion of the search request from searching bags to searching 
persons, and the detention of the bus by the officers (since the bus driver left the bus to 
allow the search).  
3) Investigatory Checkpoints 
                                                          
81 Oral argument occurred on April 16th, 2002. Transcript of oral argument. 
82 Florida v. Bostick 501 US 429 at 437 (1991). Factors included if the officer had a weapon pointed or 
used threatening language towards citizens. 
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In Illinois v. Lidster, a Chicago suburb established a checkpoint to canvass drivers 
for information about a fatal hit and run accident.83 These seizures are conducted without 
warrants, without probable cause, and without individualized suspicion that any of the 
drivers stopped have committed a crime. Attending officers distributed flyers with 
information about the hit and run to drivers. Officers arrested Mr. Lidster for drunk 
driving using evidence gathered from his interaction with them at the checkpoint. 
The State of Illinois argued that this seizure was constitutional based on a Brown 
v. Texas balancing test. The State of Illinois tried to justify the roadblock because of a 
lesser expectation of privacy for drivers. This theory faced problems in oral argument as 
Justices noted that pedestrians can avoid seizure but this checkpoint does not allow 
drivers the same opportunity to avoid police interaction. Petitioner further tried to 
distinguish Lidster from Indianapolis v. Edmond.  
Respondent argued that this checkpoint is indistinguishable from the general 
interest in crime control, and checkpoints merely forwarding the general interest in crime 
control are prohibited under Indianapolis v. Edmond.84 Since this crime already occurred 
and the offender was unlikely to repeat it, it lacked exigency or a serious governmental 
concern. According to the respondent, the checkpoint could not be justified by a Brown 
analysis or Special Needs. Brown would fail because the governmental interest was not 
significant and the search program lacked notice to drivers of the checkpoint, opportunity 
for drivers to avoid police interaction, and neutral outlines on how to treat drivers with 
information, or who to bring to a secondary staging area.  
                                                          
83 Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004) 
84 Indianapolis v. Edmond 531 U.S. 32 
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Ultimately, the Court determined that this investigatory checkpoint was 
sanctioned by Brown v. Texas. Justice Breyer, the author of the majority opinion, 
distinguished it from other checkpoint cases because the checkpoint in question was not 
conducted to further the general interest in crime control. The other checkpoints detected 
crimes that were being committed by the drivers and were justified due to the Special 
Needs of the government. The checkpoint in Lidster sought information and assistance 
from drivers about a different crime. This checkpoint paralleled police actions concerned 
with public safety or crowd control. After evaluating the checkpoint with the standard 
outlined in Brown v. Texas and applied to checkpoints in Michigan v. Sitz, the Court 
determined that the checkpoint was reasonable and hence constitutional. According to the 
analysis, the relevant public concern was grave because the police investigated a known 
crime. The checkpoint advanced this grave public concern to a significant degree. Most 
importantly, the stops interfered only minimally with liberty of the sort that the Fourth 
Amendment sought to protect.  
In approving the checkpoint, the majority relied heavily on the fact that the 
interaction with the police was brief. Justice Breyer asserted that the investigatory 
checkpoint would not cause the anxiety caused by other interaction with law enforcement 
because it did not seek evidence of the crime; officers merely asked for assistance in an 
ongoing investigation. This makes the checkpoint less intrusive. The Court ultimately felt 
no constitutional limitation on these checkpoints was necessary to guard against their 
wide usage as a pretense for detecting other crimes; the limited resources of law 
enforcement would ensure investigatory checkpoints were used only when needed. 
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Three justices dissented over the results of the Brown test. Justice Stevens, the 
author of the dissent, questioned if the checkpoint would significantly advance the 
governmental concern since it was a random sampling of drivers being asked for 
assistance in solving a crime that occurred a week before the checkpoint. On the other 
side of the balancing test was a checkpoint established at midnight on a highway. Drivers 
might have to wait in line or might be alarmed by the unpublicized checkpoint. Since the 
Brown analysis did not clearly resolve the reasonableness issue, the minority voted to 
remand. 
The majority drew an analogy between the checkpoint and crowd control activity. 
However, this overlooks important differences in the two tasks of law enforcement: crime 
prevention and crime solving. In public safety and crowd control cases, facility owners 
waive their expectation of privacy by asking officers for assistance; this was not the case 
here. Also, the governmental interest in public safety or crowd control, which may cause 
significant property damage or even injuries, is significantly greater than the 
governmental interest in solving a single crime. In Illinois v. Lidster, the Court approved 
a checkpoint under the Brown v. Texas test. While this is a proper test to use, it is 
unusual because most checkpoints are approved under the Special Needs Test. While 





“It cannot be too often stated that the greatest threats to our constitutional 
freedoms come in times of crisis. But we must also stay mindful that not all 
                                                          
85 This checkpoint was unannounced (a crucial step to mitigate the intrusiveness of the checkpoint) and 
lacked neutral guidelines for operations at the secondary area where Mr. Lidster was sent after his interview 
at the primary stage 
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government responses to such times are hysterical overreactions; some crises are 
quite real, and when they are, they serve precisely as the compelling state interest 
that we have said may justify a measured intrusion on constitutional rights. The 
only way for judges to mediate these conflicting impulses is to do what they 
should do anyway: stay close to the record in each case that appears before them, 
and make their judgments based on that alone.” Dissent, Vernonia v. Acton   
 
 
As we have seen, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment 
rights has undergone a doctrinal shift of major importance during the last five years.  
Moreover, the foregoing account suggests that the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 
2001 were a significant factor in the Supreme Court’s recent turn to a general 
reasonableness analysis in Fourth Amendment cases. During these years, the Supreme 
Court rejected tests and factors normally relied upon in favor of a more lenient standard. 
No rationale is offered for this turn to the reasonableness analysis. The Supreme Court 
has tried to support their use of the reasonableness analysis with precedent, but, as 
discussed below, the precedents cited do not support the extension of the reasonableness 
test. However, there is important anecdotal and statistical evidence that the terrorist 
attacks have contributed to this change in Fourth Amendment law. 
When using the reasonableness analysis to justify the newly approved searches in 
the past five years, the Supreme Court has cited both precedents outlining the elements of 
the reasonableness analysis and precedents differentiating the case from the tests and 
factors. Although the precedents cited do use a totality of the circumstances, 
reasonableness test, they differ significantly from many of the cases in which they are 
currently being used. As explained above, before the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 
2001, the totality of the circumstances analysis applied only to two types of searches: 
those conducted with freely given consent and those conducted in the public space with 
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reasonable belief that the subject was involved in criminal activity.86 Even in these 
instances, the totality analysis was a tool used to determine whether law enforcement 
action met enumerated exceptions to the warrant requirement: the reasonableness of a 
search or the voluntariness of consent would be determined with this analysis. 87 Since 
September 11th, 2001, the Supreme Court has bypassed the enumerated exceptions and 
previously established tests and used the totality of the circumstances analysis to 
determine whether searches or seizures are permissible under the Fourth Amendment. 
In the decades prior to this change, the Court highlighted important elements 
contributing to the constitutionality of the search when applying the established tests to 
individual cases, in effect enumerating factors making a search constitutional or 
unconstitutional. The factors in particular have a great influence on law enforcement 
action by specifying permissible and impermissible action. The Circuit Courts, especially 
the Ninth, used the factors to create a checklist assisting the adjudication of specific 
cases. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, the examination of these factors 
by the Supreme Court has ended, to be replaced with an intense focus on the totality of 
the circumstances and review under a more general reasonableness analysis. 
In the search and seizure cases since 2001, a striking 100% of the cases upholding 
searches overturned the decision of the lower court. These lower courts had applied the 
traditional tests and carefully enumerated the factors previously deemed important by the 
Supreme Court. But when reviewed by the Court, these decisions were overturned. In 
theory and to a large degree also in practice, lower courts (both Circuit and state Supreme 
                                                          
86 Determining Consent: Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1972), United States v. Sokolow (1989). Determining 
Reasonable Suspicion for a Search: Traffic Stop: Carroll v. United States (1925), Stop and Frisk: Terry v. 
Ohio (1968). Border Stop: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce (1975), United States v. Cortez (1981). 
87 Since 2001, the Supreme Court has deemed public space searches conducted with reasonable suspicion to 
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Courts) are bound by the decisions and methodology of the U.S. Supreme Court, yet 
neither utilized the reasonableness analysis because the precedents established before the 
terrorist attacks demanded different methods of review. This is compelling support for 
the substitution starting in 2001 of a new judicial standard substantially affecting 
adjudication of search and seizure cases. (Interestingly, the lower courts heard most of 
these cases before the terrorist attacks.)  
Beyond that, in many of the cases the Supreme Court introduced the 
reasonableness analysis in their opinion; neither advocate had argued for review under a 
reasonableness analysis. Appellants study the relevant law closely before arguing in front 
of the Supreme Court. Yet none of the appellants examined above tailored their 
arguments to a general reasonableness inquiry.88 Instead, the cases were argued under the 
established tests and factors that were the basis of review in the lower Courts. 
When hearing these cases, members of the Court often express their concern with 
the implications of their decisions. A frequent opinion leader on the court, Justice 
O’Connor has perhaps been the most explicit of the justices in voicing national security 
concerns at oral argument. Many of the other justices have also mentioned national 
security in their opinions. Justices frequently express wariness of stifling law 
enforcement actions, double guessing officers’ judgment, and permitting broad search 
programs because budgetary concerns are a natural constraint against their use. Seen in 
light of the September 11th terrorist attacks, these concerns are about ensuring that law 
enforcement has all the tools required to fight all crimes. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
be constitutional. 
88 The consent case US v. Drayton and the knock and announce case US v. Banks argued the totality of the 
circumstances because consent and individual police action cases are adjudicated under that standard. 
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Statistical evidence also places the drastic change in adjudication at October 1st, 
2001, the start of the 2001 term. Ten of the fifteen cases decided since the terrorist attacks 
of September 11th have utilized the reasonableness analysis.89 In eight of the fifteen cases 
the Court unanimously supported the search or seizure. The first pure search and seizure 
case where the Court did not approve the search was heard in fall of 2005. The Court held 
13 consecutive searches and seizure constitutional. Search and seizure cases heard in 
2001, 2003, and 2004 all validated police action that had been held unconstitutional by 
the lower court. There have not been three consecutive years where all the searches and 
seizures were upheld in over 35 years.90  
The Court has also been approving searches at a substantially higher rate. Before 
the terrorist attacks the Rehnquist Court approved 66.7%of searches and seizures; since 
the attacks it has approved 93.33%.91 From 1994 to 2005, the Court had no membership 
changes. The Roberts Court has issued only two opinions dealing with search and seizure 
as of May 18th, 2006; one of these cases was the first case since 2001 to find a search 
unconstitutional. The very same people who upheld every search since the terrorist 
attacks of September 11th, 2001 upheld less than two thirds of search and seizure cases 
from 1994 to 2000. The changing state of search and seizure law is due to a change in 
doctrine, not a change in personnel.  
Perhaps even more surprising, the Supreme Court has offered no explicit rationale 
for this change in their recent application of tests and factors. Instead, in support of their 
application of the reasonableness analysis, the Court cites precedents employing the 
                                                          
89 See Appendix B. Many of these cases dealt with individual police action, so totality of the circumstances 
might be the proper standard to utilize. 
90 Data not available before 1969, see Appendix A 
91 See Appendix C.  
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totality of the circumstances analysis. The cases cited are proper applications of the 
totality analysis (consent and police action in public space) but in these cases the Court 
used them to support searches of homes and detentions and questioning of people in their 
homes.92
There are many other possible explanations for this change that are not sufficient 
to explain the adoption of the reasonableness test. Some might think that law enforcement 
agencies created search programs better suited to pass the tests previously utilized by the 
Supreme Court.93 But this is not true since the programs failed the previously established 
tests at the lower court levels. All of these programs exceeded the scope of permissible 
searches and seizures established in previous decisions of the Court. Although the 
advocates of these search programs tried to justify their programs in terms of the old 
tests, each Supreme Court decision ignored the factors traditionally used to apply these 
tests. The searches of individuals were similarly extensions of the previous doctrines that 
met with difficulty at the lower court only to be rescued by a reasonableness analysis in 
the nation’s highest court. 
Others might suggest that during this period states and municipalities developed 
better arguments supporting these searches. In reviewing the oral arguments, it is clear 
that advocates relied on the same arguments: they claim that the factors established by the 
relevant test permit this search. Only in cases where the relevant standard was the totality 
of the circumstances analysis did advocates turn to a reasonableness analysis. Other 
advocates found the reasonableness analysis thrust on them by the Court. In oral 
argument in Illinois v. Lidster, Justice Breyer, who went on to write the majority opinion, 
                                                          
92 Knights v. United States and Muehler v. Mena 544 US ___ (2005).  
93 Programs examined since the terrorist attacks are the drug testing of students in Pottawatomie v. Earls, 
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asked Lidster’s attorney “why isn’t this the most reasonable thing in the world?” Since 
the case was adjudicated under Special Needs and Brown tests, none of the attorneys 
argued under this new standard. 
Perhaps the most convincing alternate hypothesis is that the use of the 
reasonableness analysis is a growing trend in Fourth Amendment adjudication and the 
Court often ignores factors to manipulate the outcome. Many law review articles date this 
trend back to the 1968 case of Terry v. Ohio.94 While it is true that the reasonableness 
analysis was used prior to the terrorist attacks, it was constrained and these restraints 
have eroded since 2001. The use of balancing was limited to determining whether law 
enforcement action created a coercive environment that nullified a consent-based search, 
or whether law enforcement had met the standard of suspicion necessary to uphold a 
search or seizure in public space. Terry created the latter use of the reasonableness 
analysis, but it was constrained to public spaces and clarified by the factors outlined in 
Brown v. Texas which governs stops of the same nature. Terry states that a search must 
be justified at its inception and limited in scope, while Maryland v. Pringle, decided in 
2003, states that the scope of a search can include all occupants of a vehicle. The Court 
also rejected the place restriction on the application of the reasonableness test. For 
example, reasonableness approved the search of a home in Knights; previously, 
warrantless searches of homes required warrants. 
Furthermore, the nature of the balancing test has changed significantly since 
2001. During that period, the Supreme Court has held that the governmental interest 
                                                                                                                                                                             
bus search programs in US v. Drayton, and investigatory checkpoints in Illinois v. Lidster. 
94 For example Clancy, Thomas K.. “The Fourth Amendment’s Concept of Reasonableness.” Utah Law 
Review (2004): 977- 1044. and Urbonya, Kathryn R.. “Rhetorically Reasonable Police Practices: Viewing 
the Supreme Court’s Multiple Discourse Paths.” American Criminal Law Review 40 (2003): 1397- 1442. 
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element of the test is met when an officer has reasonable suspicion that a person is 
engaged in criminal activity, the previous level having been probable cause.95 
Reasonableness has justified searching homes, searching associates in a vehicle, and 
lowering the degree of privacy intrusion in the Special Needs analysis. Kathyrn Urbonya 
argues that the 1996 case Whren v. United States established a balancing test to be 
applied only in extraordinary circumstances. Urbonya then finds that extraordinary 
circumstances are no longer necessary.96 While this is certainly a reasonable way to 
describe the phenomenon, what the Court has effectively done is create a new balancing 
test – the reasonableness test—that is applied in a growing number of circumstances to 
justify warrantless searches and seizures. 
There is strong reason to conclude, therefore, that the increased focus on security 
after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center has substantially affected Supreme 
Court adjudication. For search and seizure cases, the Court has increasingly turned since 
the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, to a reasonableness analysis, ignoring 
factors elucidated in prior cases and manipulating tests to approve questionable 
warrantless searches and seizures. Some of these changes have been due to increasing 
acceptance of law enforcement in daily life caused by the terrorist attacks of September 
11th, 2001. Citizens have grudgingly accepted more extensive and frequent searches in 
airports, government buildings, and schools. These changing expectations have affected 
the application of the previously used tests because one factor in these tests is a person’s 
expectation of privacy. Since the terrorist attacks, citizens have accepted a lesser 
expectation of privacy in many areas of life. The weakening of procedural civil rights 
                                                          
95 See US v. Knights, Muehler v. Mena, MORE 
96 Urbonya, Kathryn R..at 1419. 
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commitments among Democrats and traditional liberals may have also contributed to a 
greater acceptance of law enforcement in the public sphere. Increased support for law 
enforcement departments at all levels in the 1990s contributed to the acceptance of police 
actions. 
The September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks have affected Fourth Amendment 
adjudication by raising concerns on the Court about stifling law enforcement which 
previously did not seem to hold the same urgency. The Court has been placing extra 
emphasis on deferring to the experience of law enforcement agencies in establishing 
search programs, and to officials in determining the appropriateness of a search. This 
leaves the law less clear and more difficult to apply. Finally, many of the search and 
seizure cases heard by the Supreme Court deal directly with national security. Some 
argue that border stops and searches on mass transportation are important tools to 
detecting and preventing terrorist activity in the United States. The use of drug dogs to 
search vehicles parallels the use of dogs trained to detect explosives. These concerns 
gained greater prominence after the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 and have 
provided the most important rationale for these sweeping changes in the Court’s search 
and seizure law. 
The reasonableness analysis has been adopted, in large part, to permit more 
intrusive searches by law enforcement conducted under a lower standard of suspicion.97 
An individual’s interest in their phone records, taking an extremely topical example, 
seems negligible when compared with the governmental interest in detecting terrorism it 
its borders. Too little is known about the NSA domestic data collection program to 
                                                          
97 Of the fifteen cases heard since 2001, in only 3 cases did law enforcement need probable cause for their 
actions; all three of these were arrests. Seven cases approved suspicionless searches, and three cases 
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determine if this is an appropriate standard for adjudication, the Telecommunications Act 
of 1934 and PATRIOT Act may introduce other concerns. However, the line of cases 
examined above lay the groundwork for the adjudication of many Fourth Amendment 
cases under the more lenient reasonableness analysis. 
Search and seizure law is a major factor shaping the everyday actions of law 
enforcement officials across the country. Knowing the current state of search and seizure 
law allows law enforcement officials to act accordingly, permits attorneys to note 
inappropriate deviations, and guides judges in arbitrating between the two. For this 
reason, it is imperative that expanding police powers be thoroughly examined to ensure 
no individual rights are violated. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, the 
Supreme Court has abandoned the established tests and factor-based analysis that had 
safeguarded individual rights against governmental intrusion. Instead the Court has 
adopted a much more lenient reasonableness analysis which permits many searches and 
seizures previously prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
permitted searches based on reasonable suspicion, a standard the Supreme Court has difficulty defining. 
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Appendix A: Search and Seizure Cases Supreme Court Terms 1996-2005 
Data from Released Opinions,  
2005 data compiled from released opinions as of May 18th, 2006. 
Bolding indicates that case was added to the Supreme Court Database Information  
Term Case Issue Circumstances Result Margin Rationale 
1996 Ohio v. 
Robinette 
Consent and the 
Scope of Traffic 
Stops 
Man stopped, asked to 
leave car, given ticket, 






Totality of the 
Circumstances -- 
Consent Case 






Officer stops car for 
traffic violation, notices 
odd behavior, orders 

















candidates for state 







No Special Need, 
targeted class 
unlikely to use 
drugs 




and felony drug 
charges 
Force used for to enter 
hotel room after 


















Officers break into home 
to apprehend dangerous 
criminal reasonably 








justified use of 
force, reasonable 




and Parole v. 
Scott 
Scope of Federal 
Exclusionary 
Rule and Parole 
Hearings 
Parole Officer obtains 








Rule applies only 
to criminal trials, 
parole non-
adversarial 






Officer looks through 
gap in blinds and 









privacy to have 
standing 
1998 Knowles v. 
Iowa 
Search incident 
to citation and 
search incident 
to arrest 
Officer issues citation 








Must have safety 




1998 Wyoming v. 
Houghton 
Scope of Search 
in vehicle -- 
closed 
containers 
Vehicle stopped, officer 
















Media ride along with 










unclear at time of 
event, immunity 
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Appendix A: Search and Seizure Cases Supreme Court Terms 1996-2005 
Term Case Issue Circumstances S/S Upheld Margin Rationale 





Media ride along with 










unclear at time of 
event, immunity 






Man runs from police in 
high crime area, police 








1999 Florida v. JL Standard of 
Suspicion for 
Stop and Frisk 
Person searched after 
anonymous tip that he 







needed to meet 
reasonable 
suspicion 
1999 Bond v. 
United States 
Definition of 
Search of object 
in plain view 
Officer squeezed bag of 







bag is a search, 






Checkpoint where drug 
dog investigates while 
officers verified license 










interest in crime 
control 




Drug testing of 
pregnant women 
Women tested for drug 
use, results given to 



















from entering his home 
while officers obtain 











cause, safety of 
officers and 
evidence 





Person arrested instead 
















as pretexts for 
searches 
Person arrested for 
traffic violations so 



















Heat search reveals 
evidence of lamps used 
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Appendix A: Search and Seizure Cases Supreme Court Terms 1996-2005 
Search and Seizure Cases Supreme Court Terms 2001-2005 
Term Case Issue Circumstances S/S Upheld Margin Rationale 





Law enforcment officer 
searches a probationer 
without probable cause 
















for searching a 
car 
After observing odd 
behavior, minivan 






totality of the 
circumstances, 






Drug testing in 
school 
Drug testing program for 


















Officers board bus 
stopped at the station 







Totality of the 
Circumstances: 
ignored factors 





Force used to enter 
apartment after 












2003 Maryland v. 
Pringle 
Scope of search 
based on 
probable cause 
All occupants arrested 










together to hide 
evidence 





Checkpoint at site of a 

















A suspect wouldn't 
identify himself so he 









2003 United States 
v. Flores 
Montano 
Seize a car to 
search the gas 
tank for drugs 
Gas tank removed, 
disasssmbled and 














incident to arrest 
After arresting a man, 
the officer searched the 
car he vacated before 






Police may search 
arrestee and space 
immediately 
around him -- 
Totality of the 
Circumstances 





probable cause for one 







Officers are not 
required to inform 
person of reason 
for arrest 
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Appendix A: Search and Seizure Cases Supreme Court Terms 1996-2005 
Search and Seizure Cases Supreme Court Terms 2001-2005 
Term Case Issue Circumstances S/S Upheld Margin Rationale 






Drug dog searches car 
while stopped for traffic 






Drug dog isn't a 
search, no 
violation if stop is 
reasonable 
2004 Muehler v. 
Mena 
temporary 
seizure of person 
While the police search 
a home, the occupants 














A wife allowed the 

















Warrant to search a 
package upon delivery 
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Appendix B: Search and Seizure Cases 1969-2004 
Data from Supreme Court Database  
Conservative Decisions Upheld the Search or Seizure, Liberal Decisions Overturned the Search or Seizure 
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Appendix B: Search and Seizure Cases 1969-2004
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Appendix C: Rehnquist Court and Search and Seizure Cases  
Data from Supreme Court Database 
2005 data compiled from released opinions as of May 18th, 2006. 
* Case added to the original data
 
Number of Searches 
Year Upheld Denied 
1994 1 1 
1995 1 1 
1996 3 0 
1997 2 0 
1998 5 1 
1999 1 2 
2000* 3 3 




Number of Searches 
Year Upheld Denied 
2001* 4 0 
2003 6 0 
2004 3 0 
2005 1 1 



























24 Total Search and Seizure Cases 1994-
2000 
 
B) 16 Searches and Seizures 
Upheld       =   .66666 
24 Total Search and Seizure Cases 
 





14 Total Search and Seizure Cases 2001-
2006 
 
C) 14 Searches and Seizures 
Upheld       =   .93333 
15 Total Search and Seizure Cases 
 
%93.3 Searches and Seizures Upheld 
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